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A number of studies have pointed to various mistakes that consumers might make in their 
consumption-saving and financial decisions. We utilize a unique market experiment conducted 
by a large U.S. bank to assess how systematic and costly such mistakes are in practice. The bank 
offered consumers a choice between two credit card contracts, one with an annual fee but a lower 
interest rate and one with no annual fee but a higher interest rate. To minimize their total interest 
costs net of the fee, consumers expecting to borrow a sufficiently large amount should choose the 
contract with the fee, and vice-versa.  
We find that on average consumers chose the contract that ex post minimized their net 
costs. A substantial fraction of consumers (about 40%) still chose the ex post sub-optimal 
contract, with some incurring hundreds of dollars of avoidable interest costs. Nonetheless, the 
probability of choosing the sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the 
potential error, and consumers with larger errors were more likely to subsequently switch to the 
optimal contract. Thus most of the errors appear not to have been very costly, with the exception 
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A number of studies have pointed to various mistakes that consumers might make in their 
consumption-saving and financial decisions (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1988). However, it 
remains unclear how systematic and costly such mistakes are in practice. Studies of consumer 
decision-making in actual market environments are rare. Among the few such studies, 
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2002) find that consumers systematically choose sub-optimal 
membership plans at health clubs, but Miravete (2003) finds consumers’ choices of telephone 
billing plans to be closer to optimal. 
The quality of consumers’ decision-making might of course vary across different types of 
decisions.
1 This paper studies a central economic decision, the decision to borrow and choose 
between different credit contracts. Compared to the assets side of consumers’ balance sheets 
(e.g., Odean, 1998, and Heaton and Lucas, 2000), there has been much less analysis of the 
liabilities side, partly for lack of data. We analyze a unique market experiment conducted by a 
large U.S. bank. Through 1996 all credit card holders at the bank were charged annual fees. In 
late 1996, however, in response to industry trends away from using annual fees, the bank started 
offering new credit card customers a choice between two pre-specified credit card contracts: one 
with an annual fee but a lower interest rate (APR) and one with no annual fee but a higher 
interest rate. To minimize their total interest costs net of the fee, consumers expecting to borrow 
a sufficiently large amount should choose the contract with the annual fee, and vice versa. We 
utilize an administrative dataset that records the contract choice and subsequent monthly 
borrowing behavior of over a hundred thousand credit card holders at the bank from 1997-1999. 
This dataset allows us to determine which account-holders chose the ex post sub-optimal 
                                                           
1 DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) discuss a range of consumer markets. See also Gabaix and Laibson (2004) and 
Waldfogel (2004).  
 contract, given their subsequent behavior, and if so how costly was their mistake.  Further, the 
account-holders had the option to later switch contracts, so we can also study whether they 
learned from and corrected their mistakes.  
Credit cards play an important role in consumer finances, so they are a good test-case for 
analyzing the quality of consumers’ financial decision-making. In the mid-to-late 1990s (the start 
of our sample period), about 20 percent of aggregate personal consumption was being purchased 
using credit cards (Chimerine, 1997). Moreover, for most households credit cards, in particular 
bankcards (i.e., Visa, Mastercard, Discover, and Optima cards), represent the leading source of 
unsecured credit. About two-thirds of households at the time had at least one bankcard, and of 
these households at least 56 percent were borrowing on their bankcards, that is paying interest 
not just transacting (Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 1995).
2 Conditional on borrowing, the 
typical bankcard account was borrowing about $2000, with the account-holder having roughly 
another $5000 of balances on other cards. These are large magnitudes relative to typical 
household balance sheets. They are also large in the aggregate: total credit card balances now 
amount to about $800B (Federal Reserve Board, 2005). 
The stakes involved in making optimal consumer-credit decisions are therefore 
potentially quite large. Also, whether to borrow or not on a credit card is a decision that most 
households make on a monthly basis, and so is a familiar decision, and the choice between the 
two credit contracts that we study is relatively simple.  Hence the results should be interpreted as 
a minimal test of the quality of consumers’ financial decision-making. 
  After rationalizing some salient aspects of consumers’ credit card usage, Gross and 
Souleles (2002) highlight two more puzzling aspects. First, why does such a large fraction of 
  2consumers hold substantial credit card debt? Conventional buffer-stock models calibrated using 
estimated income processes have difficulty rationalizing so much borrowing at high credit card 
interest rates (Laibson et al., 2002; Angeletos et al., 2001). Second, why do many credit card 
borrowers simultaneously hold low-yielding assets (both illiquid and even liquid)? For example, 
Gross and Souleles document that about one-third of credit card borrowers have substantial 
assets in checking and savings (beyond levels reasonably needed for cash transactions), 
apparently in violation of no-arbitrage conditions.  
Some of the most common potential explanations for these puzzles are based on 
problems of commitment and self-control. For example, Laibson et al. (2002) show that 
consumers with hyperbolic discount functions, which generate time-inconsistency and 
commitment problems, would be more likely than consumers with standard exponential discount 
functions to borrow at credit card interest rates, and to simultaneously hold illiquid assets.
3 An 
innovative paper by Ausubel (1991) considered a related hypothesis as a potential explanation 
(among others) for the “stickiness” of credit card interest rates: consumers might repeatedly 
underestimate the probability that they will borrow (e.g., perhaps because they are unable to 
commit not to borrow), and so might be relatively insensitive to borrowing rates. Ausubel (1999) 
distinguishes promotional “teaser” interest rates, and concludes that consumers are overly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 As noted by Gross and Souleles (2002), this figure probably understates the fraction of households borrowing on 
their bankcards, because SCF households appear to underreport their bankcard debt. This paragraph draws heavily 
on Gross and Souleles (2002). See also Yoo (1998). 
3 In analyzing the second, portfolio puzzle, it is useful to distinguish between liquid and illiquid assets. In the 
absence of additional frictions like transactions costs or mental accounts, hyperbolic consumers (e.g., Laibson et al., 
2002) would not violate no-arbitrage conditions, and so would not simultaneously hold credit card debt and liquid 
assets. However, other models with related self-control problems can potentially generate such outcomes. For 
instance, under “planner-doer” models (Thaler and Shefrin, 1988), some people might undertake costly actions to 
constrain their “impulse” spending or spending by their spouses. By not fully paying off their credit card balances, 
such people can reduce their liquidity and thereby reduce the temptation of available credit (see e.g., Bertaut and 
Halliasos, 2001). Gross and Souleles also consider additional explanations for the two puzzles. E.g., borrowers 
planning to file for bankruptcy have an incentive to hold some assets, up to the amounts protected by the bankruptcy 
exemption rules (see e.g., Lehnert and Maki, 2002). 
  3sensitive to such rates, possibly because they underestimate the probability that they will later 
borrow at higher, post-teaser rates.
4,5  
The experiment that we study is ideally suited for analyzing such issues, because 
consumers’ choices between the two credit contracts at issue should critically depend on their 
expectations regarding their future borrowing. If consumers systematically underestimate their 
probability of borrowing, we should find that many fail to pay the annual fee even though they 
later borrow substantial amounts. Conversely, it is also possible that some consumers 
overestimate their probability of borrowing, and needlessly pay the fee even though they do not 
borrow enough. With stochastic income and spending needs (e.g., medical emergencies, auto 
break-downs, etc.), some consumers will of course find ex post that they have chosen the sub-
optimal contract, even if their decision-making was ex ante perfectly rational (e.g., Souleles, 
2004). Hence, we will investigate the role of ex post shocks and, more importantly, we will focus 
on exploring the limits of the mistakes consumers make. In particular we will examine whether 
mistakes are less likely as the potential dollar loses increase in magnitude, and whether larger 
mistakes tend to be subsequently corrected.  
  Previewing the main results, we find that on average consumers chose the credit contract 
that ex post minimized their total interest costs net of the annual fee. A substantial fraction of 
consumers (about 40%) still chose the ex post sub-optimal contract, with a few non-fee-paying 
consumers incurring hundreds of dollars of readily avoidable interest charges. These sub-optimal 
outcomes appear not to be entirely due to ex post shocks. Nonetheless, the probability of 
                                                           
4 Gross and Souleles (2002) find significant elasticities of credit card spending and debt to changes in credit card 
APRs, even small, non-promotional changes. These results do not imply, however, that the card holders respond 
optimally to the APRs. Among other potential explanations for APR stickiness, Ausubel (1991), Calem and Mester 
(1995), and Calem, Gordy, and Mester (2005) point out that switching costs could also make consumers relatively 
less sensitive to the APR on a given credit card, ceteris paribus.  
  4choosing the sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the potential error. 
Further, while relatively few consumers switched contracts, those who made larger errors in their 
initial contract choice were more likely to subsequently switch to the optimal contract. Thus 
most of the errors appear not to have been very costly, with the noteworthy exception that a 
small minority of consumers persists in holding substantially sub-optimal contracts without 
switching.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 
begins by analyzing the consumers that did not switch contracts, the bulk of the sample, and 
Section 4 then focuses on the switchers. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data 
We use a unique, proprietary panel dataset from a large U.S. bank that issues credit cards 
nationally. The dataset had been previously created for other purposes internal to the bank, but it 
contains the information that we need to study the contract choice of interest here. The dataset 
includes a representative sample of about two hundred thousand credit card accounts open as of 
December, 1999. It contains a rich set of variables describing the behavior of these accounts 
month-by-month from August, 1997 through December, 1999, a total of 29 months.
6 The bulk of 
the data consists of the main billing information listed on each account’s monthly statement, 
including debt and the credit limit. Note that credit cards can be used for both transactions and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 A few recent papers provide theoretical models of lending to consumers and entrepreneurs with various degrees of 
imperfect rationality or imperfect information. E.g., see Manove and Padilla (1999) and Bond, Musto, and Yilmaz 
(2005).  
6 Because the sample is representative of accounts open in 12/99, it does not include accounts that closed before 
12/99, but it does include accounts that entered the portfolio between 8/97 (the start of the dataset) and 12/99. (Since 
the bank began offering the contract choice in 10/96, the dataset does not record the first few months of activity for 
the accounts opened between 10/96 and 8/97.) We use all of the available account-months in the reported analysis 
below. Our main results are qualitatively similar across the entrant (opened after 8/97) and original (before 8/97) 
accounts.  
  5borrowing purposes. Our debt variable includes only interest-incurring balances that are rolled-
over, not transactions balances that are paid off. Also available are the accounts’ credit risk 
scores, which are used by card issuers as summary statistics for the fundamental risk/profitability 
characteristics of each account.
7  
Critically, the dataset includes a variable indicating which of the two credit card contracts 
the consumer chose.  The annual fees on the cards ranged from $10-24, and the increments to the 
annual APR in the absence of the fee ranged from 2.15%-4.15% (percentage points). The 
particular magnitudes of the fee and APR increment depended on the administrative subportfolio 
in which the bank opened the account, as described below. Within each subportfolio, every 
consumer received the same choice of credit terms (i.e., the same fixed annual fee and APR 
increment), so there was no pre-selection involved. After initially being required to choose one 
of the two contracts, the account-holders subsequently had the option to switch to the other 
contract. Only about 4% did so during our sample period, so we will begin by first studying the 
consumers who did not switch contracts, and later we will turn to the “switchers”.
8
The sub-portfolios are based on the bank’s general classification of the account-holders’ 
relationship with the bank. In addition to distinguishing special relationships like employee 
accounts, the bank classified account-holders according to the magnitude and type of assets held 
at the bank as of the time the credit card account was opened. Hence the dataset includes an 
indicator variable distinguishing account-holders with initial financial assets (combining CDs, 
                                                           
7 The credit risk scores come from the credit bureaus, and so summarize the account-holders’ credit activity across 
all of their credit cards and other debt. Our dataset does not include any other credit bureau data, nor any 
demographic characteristics of the account-holders. Nonetheless, because the account-holders had to choose 
between the two offered contracts, we can analyze the optimality of their choices even without additional 
information regarding the rest of their credit cards. For an analysis of credit risk including credit bureau data, see 
Gross and Souleles (2002a) and Musto and Souleles (2005). Domowitz and Sartain (1999) also analyze consumer 
bankruptcy.  
8 Miravete (2002) and DellaVigna and Malmendier (2002) also find relatively few people switching across calling 
and health plans, respectively. 
  6IRAs, mutual funds, etc., as well as liquid assets) at the bank greater than $25,000 and liquid 
assets (combining checking, savings, MMMF, etc.) greater than $5000. While we do not know 
which account-holders with fewer assets at this bank have substantial assets elsewhere, it is clear 
that consumers with over $25,000 of financial assets and $5000 of liquid assets are relatively 
wealthy and liquid compared to the typical consumer in the U.S. Hence we will refer to their 
accounts as the wealthy accounts.
9   
We exclude from the sample accounts that were delinquent, bankrupt, or otherwise 
frozen; and the few accounts (about 300) that were offered a low teaser rate at any time within 
the sample period. The treatment of these accounts is determined by factors outside the contract 
choice at issue here. We also drop employee and student accounts, since they too were treated 
differently.
10 The resulting sample contains over 150,000 accounts.   
Table 1 presents key summary statistics, cross-sectionally across the sample accounts. 
Column (1) refers to all accounts, while columns (2) and (3) distinguish the accounts that pay 
and do not pay the annual fee. We refer to these accounts as “payers” and “non-payers”, 
respectively. About 56% of accounts are payers and 44% non-payers. Since the account-holders 
were required to actively choose one of the two contracts, and about half chose each contract, 
this suggests that their contract choice was quite possibly a deliberate decision (assuming they 
were not randomizing). In this first table the sample includes all accounts, including those that 
subsequently switch contracts, based on their initial contract choice. The results are very similar 
on dropping the relatively few switching accounts.   
                                                           
9 The bank also distinguished account-holders with intermediate financial assets (above $10,000) and no financial 
assets at the bank, however our analysis below that uses wealth only needs to identify a set of relatively wealthy 
account-holders.  
10 E.g., employees were not charged annual fees, and student credit limits were limited to under $400 on average 
with no annual fees reported in the dataset. 
  7Note that payers receive an average interest rate break of about 3 percentage points (≈ 
15.2% - 12.1%), but pay an annual fee averaging about $20. Also note that the payers and non-
payers have similar credit scores and credit limits, so based on the information that issuers 
typically use to characterize accounts, these accounts appear to be relatively similar. However, 
the accounts that chose to pay the annual fee turned out to accumulate substantially more debt, 
almost twice as much. (For each account, we first averaged monthly debt over the entire sample 
period to reduce the influence of temporary debt due to special circumstances, e.g., holiday 
shopping, taking a long vacation abroad, etc.; and then averaged the results cross-sectionally 
across accounts.) Qualitatively, these results already suggest the possibility that payers might 
have paid the annual fee in anticipation of reducing the interest costs on their relatively large 
future debt. Nonetheless it remains to be seen how many account-holders actually chose the 
quantitatively optimal contract.  
 
3. Results: Contract Choice  
This section examines account-holders’ contract choices and subsequent borrowing 
behavior to determine which account-holders chose the ex-post sub-optimal contract, and if so 
how costly was their mistake. Most of the analysis is relatively non-parametric, since these issues 
are conducive to such analysis.  
Table 2 reports the distribution of debt subsequent to the contract choice, distinguishing 
the payers and non-payers. (The sample omits the switching accounts, since they will be studied 
separately later. The results including the switchers are quantitatively very similar, as noted 
below.) As in Table 1, column (1) shows that payers generally borrow more. In particular, 
conditional on paying the fee, over 31% of payers carry debt of more than $1200 per month on 
  8average over the entire sample period, a substantial amount. In the second column, non-payers 
borrow less, with over 50% of them not borrowing at all over the entire sample period. On the 
other hand, almost 24% of the payers did not borrow at all yet still paid the annual fee. It is 
possible that they overestimated the probability that they would borrow, at least ex post. 
Conversely, over 12% of non-payers borrowed over $1200 per month. Had they paid the fee, the 
resulting interest savings would have more than covered the fee. It is possible that they 
underestimated the probability that they would borrow, at least ex post.  
  It is important to remember, however, that the account-holders that ex post chose the 
incorrect contract might still have made the optimal choice ex ante. Ex post, their borrowing 
needs might have happened to turn out different than expected. For instance, some of the 
potential “underestimators” might not initially have expected to borrow, with good reason, but 
might have subsequently been hit with adverse shocks, such as unexpected unemployment, that 
ex post prompted them to borrow. Conversely, some of the potential “overestimators” might 
initially have expected to borrow, but might have subsequently benefited from positive shocks. 
With stochastic income and spending needs, we expect some of both “type I” and “type II” 
contract errors ex post. Further, bringing in risk-aversion, some account-holders might pay the 
annual fee for insurance purposes, even if the probability that they will need to borrow a lot is 
small. 
  While it is generally difficult to test ex-post shock explanations (Souleles, 2004), we can 
make some progress by comparing the results to those in column (2) for just the wealthy 
account-holders, who are known to have over $25,000 of financial assets. Only 22% of the 
wealthy account-holders paid the annual fee, less than the 55% incidence of payers in the overall 
sample (bottom row). This is not surprising since wealthy account-holders should have less need 
  9than others to borrow on their credit cards in the first place. However, conditional on not paying 
the fee, 10% of the wealthy non-payers nonetheless borrow over $1200 per month. This result is 
broadly similar in magnitude to the fraction of the total sample of non-payers that borrows that 
much. Given the wealth and liquidity of these 10% of wealthy non-payers with high debt, it 
seems unlikely that unexpected bad shocks entirely explain why they borrowed so much on their 
credit cards. Indeed, borrowing while simultaneously holding substantial assets is the portfolio 
puzzle highlighted by Gross and Souleles (2002), and so shocks alone appear to be insufficient to 
rationalize the behavior of these consumers in the context of a conventional model. Conversely, 
conditional on paying the fee, as before a large fraction of the wealthy payers turned out not to 
borrow at all, about 40%. 
   Overall, comparing columns (1) and (2), the pattern of results is broadly similar across 
the wealthy versus non-wealthy accounts.
11 This is suggestive, although admittedly not 
conclusive, that ex post shocks alone are not driving these (and later) results.
12 That said, 
whatever the sources of account-holders’ ex post errors, the rest of the analysis focuses on 
examining the limits of the errors, e.g. whether errors are less likely when the potential loses 
increase in magnitude, and whether large errors tend to be later corrected.   
  In Table 3, the top panel calculates the fractions of account-holders that chose the optimal 
and sub-optimal contracts ex post, as in Miravete (2003). The first row computes the “potential 
net savings” from paying the fee, based on the potential gross interest savings from paying net of 
the fee itself. For the non-payers, it is the interest savings they would have gained if they had 
                                                           
11 The percentages in the table condition on contract choice to facilitate comparisons across the wealthy versus non-
wealthy accounts, since different fractions of them pay the fee. The pattern of results is also broadly similar across 
the columns if the percentages are re-expressed relative to the entire sample.  
12 Recall that wealth is measured only as of the time the credit card account was opened, so could have changed over 
the sample period. However, given the moderate length of the sample period, wealth is unlikely to have changed 
very much for most accounts. In particular, the “wealthy” accounts will still on average be wealthier over the period 
  10paid the fee, net of the fee, using their actual debt levels. If their net savings is positive, they 
should ex post have paid the fee. For the payers, it is the interest they are already saving, again 
net of the fee. If their net savings is positive, they were correct ex post to have paid the fee. So in 
either case, a positive number for net savings implies that the account-holder should ex post have 
paid the fee. These figures are calculated averaging over the entire sample period, but expressed 
in annual terms for comparison with the annual fee. 
  As reported in column (1), for non-payers the average net savings is slightly negative (-
$1.9). That is, on average the non-payers were correct not to have paid the fee. In fact, almost 
80% of them chose the optimal contract, even ex post; only 21% chose the sub-optimal contract. 
By contrast, for payers the average net savings is positive, over $22, and so on average the 
payers were correct to have paid the fee. However, the median net savings is negative, so that 
slightly more than half of payers, about 55%, chose the incorrect contract ex post. Overall, 
combining both payers and non-payers, the majority of account-holders chose the optimal 
contract, though a substantial fraction, about 40%, still chose the sub-optimal contract. Again 
these results are generally similar for the wealthy account-holders in column (2). 
  For the account-holders who chose the incorrect contract, how significant are their 
errors? Note that more account-holders erred by incorrectly paying the annual fee than by 
incorrectly not paying the fee. Nonetheless, for the account-holders who incorrectly paid the fee, 
the cost of the error is bounded by the fee itself, which is relatively small. By contrast, for the 
account-holders who did not pay the fee but should have, the potential losses are much larger 
because they can potentially borrow thousands of dollars. The bottom panel of column (1) shows 
the distribution of the error costs. For 225 non-payers, the net error is over $200 of avoidable 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
than the “non-wealthy” accounts. Moreover, the similarity of the results across wealthy vs. non-wealthy accounts 
holds even for the newer accounts for which the wealth measure is more up-to-date. 
  11interest payments per year; for 30 non-payers, it is over $300 per year. Since these account-
holders had the option to switch contracts, their failure to do so is particularly noteworthy. Also, 
these figures reflect just one of the credit cards they hold. Since the average account-holder has 
multiple cards, at the household level the errors could be even larger. Hence, for a small minority 
of account-holders the costs of their incorrect contract choice appear to be significant.
13
On the other hand, note that as net potential savings increases in magnitude (moving 
down the table), the fraction of accounts not paying (as opposed to paying) declines, from 37% 
not-paying at a net savings of $0-$25, to less than 7% not-paying at a net savings above $300. In 
other words, as the stakes increase, consumers are increasingly likely to have chosen the cost-
minimizing contract. Otherwise the total losses from sub-optimal contracts could have been 
much larger.  
For the wealthy account-holders, in the second panel at the right, the same qualitative 
patterns appear. Larger fractions of wealthy accounts with high net savings are non-paying, 
though an error of a given dollar amount might matter less to the wealthy.
14  
 
4. Results: Contract Switching 
We now turn to the account-holders who switched contracts. Only about 6% of the initial 
payers switched to not-paying during the sample period, and less than 1% of the initial non-
payers switched to paying. The fact that so few account-holders switch contracts could partly 
                                                           
13 As noted below, these large errors persist over time across the sample period.  
14 As already noted, the results in this section are quantitatively very similar on including the switching accounts. In 
particular, 42% of the resulting total sample of all accounts chose the incorrect contract (compared to 40% in Table 
3), with the fractions incorrect conditional on payment status similar to those in Table 3.  
  12reflect transactions costs and inertia.
15 We focus on whether, conditional on switching, the right 
accounts switched.  
Table 4 compares the switchers both before (top panel) and after (bottom panel) they 
switch. In column (3), (pay, not pay) refers to the accounts that started with the contract paying 
the annual fee, but later switched to the other contract without the fee. Conversely, in column (4), 
(not pay, pay) refers to those that switched from the contract without the fee to the contract 
paying the fee. In columns (1) and (2), (pay, pay) and (not pay, not pay) refer to the accounts that 
did not change contracts.  
In the top panel, for comparison the results for the accounts that did not switch are 
repeated from Table 3. Their net savings are again first averaged over the entire sample period 
and expressed in annual terms. For accounts that switched, the potential net savings before the 
switch are averaged over all available months before the switch, and again annualized.
16 Recall 
that the accounts under (pay, pay) in column (1) have positive net potential savings on average 
(though slightly more than half of the accounts chose the sub-optimal contract). Contrast this 
with the accounts under (pay, not pay) in column (3), those that stopped paying the fee. Although 
they were also initially paying the fee, their net benefits from doing so were negative on average 
(-$16), and over 90% of them were in the sub-optimal contract at the time. That is, of the 
account-holders initially choosing to pay the annual fee, those for whom the choice was incorrect 
and relatively costly were disproportionately likely to later switch to the other contract. 
                                                           
15 O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) show that naïve hyperbolic discounting can generate substantial procrastination 
even with small per period transactions costs to acting. In our sample period, no accounts switched more than once. 
We cannot however tell whether some of the accounts that do not switch within our sample period might have 
switched before we begin to observe them at the start of the sample period in 8/97, so these reported fractions will 
somewhat understate the total incidence of switching. As already noted, other studies like Miravete (2002) and 
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2002) also find relatively little switching. 
16 For accounts that switch while carrying debt, the new APR also applies to their pre-existing debt. For accounts 
that switch out of the contract with the fee, there was no rebating of the pro-rated fee. It would be interesting to see 
  13Similarly, compared to the accounts that remained non-paying ((not pay, not pay) in column (2)), 
who had negative net savings, those that were initially non-paying but later switched to paying 
((not pay, pay) in column (4)) had positive and relatively large net benefits from switching. 
Again, the accounts that switched tended to be the ones with the largest errors to correct.  
Switching in response to past errors is appropriate only if past errors are predictive of 
potential future errors.
17 The bottom panel in Table 4 directly examines the ex post benefits of 
switching. It computes net savings over all available months after the switch, again annualized. 
In column (3), for those that stopped paying, the net potential savings become even more 
negative ex post. Over 96% of these switchers were in the optimal contract after their switch, 
whereas 93% of them had been in the sub-optimal contract beforehand. In column (4), for those 
that started paying, net potential savings become even more positive ex post, almost $50 on 
average. Over 67% of them were in the optimal contract after their switch, whereas 61% of them 
had been in the sub-optimal contract beforehand. These results are consistent with the switches 
generally being forward-looking.
18
Table 5 estimates multivariate logit models determining who switched. In column (1) the 
sample includes all accounts that were initially paying (i.e., both (pay, pay) and (pay, not pay)), 
with the dependent variable equal to one for those that subsequently switch to not paying ((pay, 
not pay)). Similarly, column (2) includes all accounts that were initially not paying, with 
dependent variable equal to one for those that subsequently switch to paying. All the independent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in which month consumers switched contracts, relative to when they pay the fee. Unfortunately our data does not 
identify the particular month in which the fee is actually booked. 
17 Account debt is in fact very persistent, with an AR(1) coefficient above .9 (for both switchers and non-switchers). 
18 For non-switchers, it is most natural to compute their net savings averaged from the start of the sample period. 
Nonetheless, if one compares their first 12 months in the sample with their next 12 months, the results are similar 
across the two 12-month periods (and so both periods yield similar results to the average results reported in the top 
panel of Table 4). In particular, the large errors of the minority of non-payers with substantial debt (second panel of 
Table 3) are also similar (i.e., persistent) across both 12-month periods.  
  14variables are averaged over all months before a switch, again annualized. The credit score and 
credit limit are used to control for account heterogeneity.  
In column (1), which models those who stop paying the annual fee, the coefficient on net 
savings is significantly negative. Hence, as the ex ante net benefits of paying the fee increase, 
account-holders are less likely to stop paying the fee (i.e., they are more likely to continue 
paying the fee), and vice-versa, which is consistent with Table 4. Further, “% Months Borrow” 
measures the fraction of months before the switch in which the account-holder borrowed. This 
variable has a significantly negative effect. Even controlling for the dollar magnitude of 
borrowing, the account-holders who had borrowed a greater number of times are less likely to 
stop paying the fee, and vice-versa. Conversely, column (2) models those who start paying the 
annual fee. Here net savings has a significantly positive effect. The account-holders with greater 
ex ante benefits of paying are indeed more likely to start paying.
19 The number of months 
borrowing has a significantly positive effect, so account-holders who had borrowed a greater 
number of times are more likely to start paying the fee. Thus, the probability of switching 
increases with both the size of the past error and with the number of times the account-holder 
had erred. These results are suggestive of learning.   
 
5. Conclusion 
We use a special dataset of credit card accounts to study a unique experiment that offered 
consumers a choice between two different credit contracts: one with an annual fee but a lower 
                                                           
19 To interpret the estimated effect of net savings, in column (1) a $100 increase in net savings would lead to a 3.7 
percentage point (p.p.) decrease in the probability of stopping to pay the fee, evaluating from sample means. 
Relative to the sample average probability of stopping to pay of just under 6%, this corresponds to a 69% relative 
decline in the probability of switching in this direction, a substantial effect. In column (2), a $100 increase in net 
savings would lead to a .18 p.p. increase in the probability of starting to pay the fee. While this is a smaller effect, 
the sample average probability of starting to pay is only about .7%, so the implied effect corresponds to a 24% 
relative increase in the probability of switching, again a substantial effect. 
  15interest rate and one with no annual fee but a higher interest rate. The optimal contract choice 
depends primarily on consumers’ expectations of their future borrowing, and so represents an 
ideal test-case for studying the quality of consumers’ decision-making in an important market 
context, consumer credit.  
We find that on average consumers chose the credit contract that ex post minimized their 
interest costs net of the annual fee. For consumers that did not pay the fee, on average the 
potential interest savings turned out smaller than the fee; for consumers that paid the fee, on 
average the interest savings turned out larger than the fee. However, a substantial fraction of 
consumers, about 40% overall, chose the sub-optimal contract, at least ex post. While more 
consumers incorrectly paid the fee than incorrectly failed to pay the fee, the mistakes of the fee-
payers are bounded in magnitude by the annual fee itself, which is relatively small. By contrast a 
few non-fee-payers incurred hundreds of dollars of avoidable interest charges. These sub-optimal 
outcomes seem unlikely to be entirely due to ex post shocks to income and spending needs, since 
the pattern of mistakes is similar for wealthy consumers, who should be less likely to need to 
borrow on their credit cards in response to shocks. Nonetheless, the probability of choosing the 
sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the potential error. That is, as the 
stakes increase, consumers are increasingly likely to choose the cost-minimizing contract.  
  Furthermore, while relatively few consumers switched contracts, those who made larger 
errors in their initial contract choice were more likely to subsequently switch to the other 
contract. The probability of switching also increases with the number of times that consumers 
had erred in the past. Notably, ex post most of the switchers were in the optimal contract after the 
switch, whereas most of them had been in the sub-optimal contract before the switch. These 
results are generally consistent with learning and the switches being forward-looking. 
  16  In sum, most consumers chose the optimal credit contract, and for those who chose the 
suboptimal contract, most of their errors appear not to have been very costly. A noteworthy 
exception, however, is that a small minority of consumers persists in holding substantially sub-
optimal contracts without switching. We end with some additional caveats. First, the choice 
between the two contracts studied here is especially simple. As already noted other aspects of 
consumers’ credit card usage are more puzzling, and consumers might have more trouble making 
decisions in other contexts, especially less simple and less familiar decisions (e.g., Agarwal, 
Driscoll, and Laibson, 2004). Second, even small deviations from optimal decision-making at the 
consumer level might still potentially have important aggregate implications (e.g., Gabaix and 
Laibson, 2004; or analogously for firms, Akerlof and Yellen, 1985). 
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 Annual fee ($) 
   mean  11.90 21.14  0.00 
   s.d.  10.94  4.16  0.00 
      
 Interest rate (%) 
   mean  13.37  12.09  15.20 
   s.d.  1.71  0.55  0.86 
      
 Credit score 
   mean  728  726  729 
   s.d.  94  96  90 
      
 Credit limit ($) 
   mean  6,026 6,077 5,961 
   s.d.  2,957  2,658  3,301 
      
 Average Monthly  
 Debt ($) 
   mean 








      
 






          
Notes: Means and standard deviations (s.d.) are computed cross-sectionally 
across accounts, after first averaging each variable for each account across the 
entire sample period ranging from 8/1997 - 12/1999. Fee-paying status is taken as 
of the beginning of the sample. For accounts subsequently switching contracts, 
only the period of the initial contract is included. 
 
  















 $0   23.4% 50.3% 39.9% 55.4% 
 $0-100  14.6% 15.2% 12.9% 17.4% 
 $100-500  16.6% 13.7% 13.8% 11.6% 
 $500-1200  14.3% 8.7% 10.0% 5.8% 
 >=$1200  31.1% 12.2% 23.4%  9.9% 
 total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 # accounts  82639 67411  6370  22477 
 % pay vs. not pay  0.55  0.45  0.22  0.78 
Notes: Debt is average monthly debt over all months in the sample, 8/1997-
12/1999. Wealthy accounts have at least $25,000 of financial assets, including 
$5,000 in liquid assets, at the same bank. This sample excludes accounts 
switching contracts. 














 Net savings 
 from paying fee              
 Mean ($)  22.91  -1.87  9.85  -1.31 
 % optimal contract  44.5% 79.0%  34.2%  83.8% 
 % suboptimal contract  55.5% 21.0%  65.8%  16.2% 
 % optimal/suboptimal
overall 60.0%/40.0% 72.9%/27.1 
 
 Distribution of Net 
 savings ($)              
    (# of accounts, 
      % pay vs. not pay)            
 < $0  
45901 53227  4190  18839 
  
46.3% 53.7%  18.2%  81.8% 
 $0-25 
10856 6431  935  1871 
  
62.8% 37.2%  33.3%  66.7% 
 $25-50 
7118 3074  472  705 
  
69.8% 30.2%  40.1%  59.9% 
 $50-100 
9044 2972  510  721 
  
75.3% 24.7%  41.4%  58.6% 
 $100-200 
7426 1482  246  313 
  
83.4% 16.6%  44.0%  56.0% 
 $200-300 
1852 195  17  26 
  
90.5% 9.5%  39.5% 60.5% 
 >=$300  442  30  0  2 
   93.6% 6.4%  0.0% 100.0% 
 # accounts  82639 67411  6370  22477 
% pay vs. not pay  0.55 0.45  0.22  0.78 
Notes:  Net savings is the potential savings in interest costs on paying the annual 
fee (whether or not the account-holder actually paid the fee), net of the fee itself, 
assuming the same debt levels. It is averaged over the entire sample period, but 
expressed in annual terms. % suboptimal is the fraction of accounts that chose 
the suboptimal contract ex post. For non-payers, it is the fraction whose gross 
savings exceeds the fee. For payers, it is the fraction with gross savings less 
than the fee. This sample excludes accounts switching contracts. 
 






(not pay, not pay)
(3) 




 Before switch:  
 Net savings              
 
 mean ($)  22.9  -1.9  -15.9  36.5 
 % initial contracts optimal 44.5%  79.0%  7.07%  39.41% 
 % suboptimal  55.5%  21.0%  92.9%  60.6% 
 After switch:  
 Net savings         
 mean ($)      -17.9  47.5 
 % optimal after switching      96.2%  67.1% 
 % suboptimal      3.8%  32.9% 
 # obs  82,639  67,411  4,821  505 
Notes: (pay, pay) and (not pay, not pay) include the accounts that do not change contract 
terms during the sample period. (pay, not pay) includes those that switched from paying 
to not paying, and (not pay, pay) those that switched from not paying to paying. For 
accounts that do not switch, net savings (see Table 3) is averaged over the entire sample 
period, but expressed in annual terms. For accounts that switch, net savings before the 
switch are averaged over all available months before the switch, again annualized; and 
net savings after the switch are averaged over all available months after the switch, again 
annualized.  
  23Table 5. Learning and Switching Contracts 
  
Dependent
 (1)  
Stop Paying the Fee: 
(2) 
Start Paying the Fee:  
Variable (pay, not pay) vs. (pay, pay) (not pay, pay)  vs. (not pay, not pay)
   coef.  s.e.  p-value  coef.  s.e.  p-value 
                  
 Net Savings  -0.015 0.002  <.0001 0.004  0.001  <.0001 
 % Months Borrow  -2.126 0.103  <.0001 2.007  0.150  <.0001 
 Credit Limit/1000  0.034 0.006  <.0001  0.068  0.013  <.0001 
 Credit Score/1000  0.378 0.135  0.005 -2.335  0.233  <.0001 
 Constant  -2.706 0.115  <.0001  -4.592  0.208  <.0001 
           
 # obs   87,460      67,916   
 Pseudo R2       0.128      0.094   
 Log likelihood    -16269.3      -2699.8   
            
Notes: This table estimates cross-sectional logit models of accounts that switched contracts, 
with heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. In column (1) the sample includes all accounts 
that were initially paying (i.e., both (pay, pay) and (pay, not pay)), with the dependent variable 
equal to one for those that switch to not paying (i.e., (pay, not pay)). Similarly, column (2) 
includes all accounts that were initially not paying, with dependent variable equal to one for 
those that switch to paying. All the independent variables are averaged over all months before a 
switch, and annualized. “% Months Borrow” measures the fraction of months before the switch 
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